This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, we find a significant negative relationship between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.
Introduction
The growth rate of GDP is lower in countries where growth varies more widely than it is in countries where growth is more stable (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Loayza and Hnatkovska, 2004; Mobarak, 2005) . Growth stability is therefore an important objective with respect to development. A number of studies have explored the determinants of volatility in growth rates. Rodrik (1999) and Mobarak (2005) emphasize the role of political institutions.
1 Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001) , and Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2002) , and Agion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2005) highlight the importance of the financial sector. In this brief paper, we assess whether special-interest group activity plays a role in stability.
Special-interest groups have been empirically linked to numerous political and economic outcomes -the voting behavior of politicians and election results (Stratmann, 1992 (Stratmann, , 1998 (Stratmann, , 2002 Coates, 1996) , product prices (Ellison and Wolfram, 2001) , market capitalization and stock returns (Roberts, 1990; Jayachandran, 2006; Coates and Wilson, 2007) , financial sector policy (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) , and investment and growth (Heckelman, 2000; Coates and Heckelman, 2003a and 2003b; Coates, Heckelman, and Wilson, 2007b) . In addition, special-interest group activity has been empirically linked to profit stream and stock return volatility (Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1994; Coates and Wilson, 2007) . Our findings indicate that special-interest group activity is also a determinant of the volatility of GDP growth. Using a panel data set on 108 countries, we find that interest groups are significantly and negatively associated with several measures of growth volatility.
Measurement of Interest Group Activity and Volatility
In this section we briefly describe the data used in the analysis. The dataset consists of 250 observations, on an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, over three decades, 1973-1982, 1985-1994, and 1995-2004 . All country-years for which the requisite data are available are included in the analysis.
We measure interest group activity with a count of the number of interest groups in a country. The counts are assembled using the 1973, 1985, and 1995 editions of the World Guide to Trade Associations. Counts from the Guide have also been used by Heckelman (2000) , Coates and Heckelman (2003b) , and Coates and Wilson (2007) in studies of growth determinants, and by Murrell (1984) , Kennelly and Murrell (1991) , Bischoff (2003) , and Coates, Heckelman, and Wilson (2007a) in studies of interest group formation. The Guide is an international directory of "trade associations," covering more than 170 countries, and nearly 400 categories of groups. The 1985 edition includes over 30,000 listings, stratified by country and by sector. The Guide is quite comprehensive with respect to association types, and includes groups in the industrial, commercial, trade, and service sectors, as well as professional organizations, consumer organizations, employer and labor groups, and organizations of service professionals.
Summary statistics for the group counts are listed in the top portion of Table 1 . The mean number of groups across countries is 252.50. There is substantial dispersion in the group counts, with a standard deviation more than 2.5 times the mean. Albania, GuineaBissau, Mongolia, and Yemen have the fewest groups in the sample, with 1; and the U.S. has the most groups, with 5619.
Following Mobarak (2005) , we examine several measures of the volatility of real per capita GDP growth. In particular, we examine the standard deviation and interquartile range of annual real per capita GDP growth (henceforth, Standard Deviation and Interquartile Range). We also examine each of these measures interacted with a dummy variable that captures a sign change in growth rates during the relevant decade (henceforth, Sign), and with the fraction of years in which a sign change occurred during the relevant decade (henceforth, Freq.) . These measures are computed over the periods 1973-1982 (corresponding 
Model and Methods
To more thoroughly assess the relationship between interest group activity and volatility, we estimate the following regression
where V olatility is a measure of volatility; SIG is the natural logarithm of the number of special interest groups; X is a vector of control variables; D is a vector of time dummies; α and β are parameters to be estimated, and γ γ γ and δ δ δ are vectors of parameters to be estimated; ε is a random error term; i indexes countries; and t indexes the three time periods. The variables included in the vector X are those that Mobarak (2005) identifies as significantly related to volatility. In addition, we include a measure of financial sector development, Private Credit. Variable descriptions and data sources are included in the appendix.
To account for heteroskedasticity, inference is based on the bias-adjusted HC3 variancecovariance matrix estimator, favored by Chesher and Jewitt (1987) and Cribari-Neto, Ferrari, and Oliveira (2005) . To account for bias due to endogeneity of certain righthand-side control variables, we estimate the model using instrumental variables. We treat the variables Inflation, Trade, Private Credit, and Political Rights as endogenous. Mobarak (2005) 
Regression Results
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 3a . As the first row of the table indicates, Interest Groups is negatively and significantly related to volatility in all cases. The magnitude of the effect is smallest in columns (3) and (6), when the volatility measures are interacted with the fraction of years in which a sign change in growth occurred (Freq.). The magnitude of the coefficient on Interest Groups in column (1) indicates that a one percent increase in the number of interest groups reduces the standard deviation of the growth rate by 0.494. This finding represents a 13.8% drop relative to the average of Standard Deviation. A one percent increase in groups has a slightly weaker impact relative to the mean of the Interquartile Range, reducing volatility 11.5% based on the coefficient estimate of -0.547 in column (4). These findings indicate that interest group activity has a stabilizing effect on GDP growth. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is economically meaningful.
Consistent with the findings of Mobarak (2005) , the results in Table 3a also indicate that Political Rights is significantly related to volatility. The political rights index takes high values in countries with low levels of political rights. The positive coefficient thus indicates that democracy is associated with stability in GDP growth. Sectoral Diversification and Services Share are also significantly related to volatility. The positive coefficient on Sectoral Diversification indicates that less diversified economies are more volatile, as would be expected.
2
The group counts from the 1973 edition of the Guide are not strictly comparable to the counts from the 1985 and 1995 editions, due to changes in the inclusion criterion used by the editors. The time dummies included in the model should capture systematic differences in the counts across time. However, as a robustness check on the findings in Table 3a , we have also analyzed a subsample of the data that includes only the 1985 and 1995 -2004 decades. Elimination of the 1973 -1982 decade from the sample also allows us to examine the relationship between volatility and political risk, using data from The PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide, which is available starting in 1984. Findings are reported in Table 3b .
As the first row of the table indicates, Interest Groups is negatively and significantly related to volatility in five of the six cases examined. The magnitude of the coefficients in columns (1)-(3) are similar to those in Table 3a . The magnitude of the coefficients in columns (4)-(6) are smaller than those in Table 3a . Nonetheless, the estimates indicate that the impact of Interest Groups on stability is still economically meaningful.
We explored several measures of political risk, including government stability, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality. Consistent with Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001) , none of these variables was found to be significantly related to volatility (in unreported regressions). As Table 3b indicates however, the variable Investment Profile, which captures contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays, is significantly related to several measures of volatility. The coefficients indicate that lower investment risk is, not surprisingly, associated with less volatility. Table 3a . However, when Investment Profile is excluded from the specifications, the estimated coefficients on Political Rights remain insignificant. The coefficients of variation in Political Rights are virtually identical in the full sample and the subsample, and we have not been able to identify any explanation for the inconsistent findings. We do note that Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001) examine the role of institutional development in volatility, including a measure of democracy, and do not find such variables are significantly related to volatility.
Concluding Remarks
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001) write, "We need to ask whether this high volatility [in GDP growth] can be explained simply by the fact that the countries are exposed to more shocks (or have a less diversified economy) than others or whether it is explained by other aspects of their structure or policy regimes." The findings presented here take a step toward answering this question, by investigating the relationship between interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. We find that interest groups are significantly and negatively related to volatility. Interest groups thus appear to be an institutional structure linked to stability. Stigler (1971) and Olson (1982) suggest that interest groups seek to protect incumbent firms and/or workers, and block innovation. Olson (1982) also argues that groups impede efficient resource reallocation in response to shocks. In future work we will attempt to identify whether these hypotheses underlie the negative relationship between interest groups and volatility revealed here. Future work should also more thoroughly explore the extent to which links between democracy and volatility can be attributed to the role of interest groups in open and free societies. Further analysis of the impact of groups on financial sector policy may also yield useful insights into volatility.
In addition, the findings presented here should stimulate theoretical work. A number of formal theoretical models link interest groups and growth, including Prescott (1994, 1999) , Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) , Herrendorf and Teixeria (2004) , and Parente and Zhao (2006) . However, to our knowledge, no formal theoretical work links groups and growth volatility. The findings here suggest that such work could provide a promising opportunity for structural empirical studies. In addition, Grier, Munger, and Roberts (1994) find that interest group activity is negatively associated with variability in the profit streams of U.S. industries. Their findings suggest that models in which risk averse firms lobby for policies that reduce the variability of their profit streams may be of interest.
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
The dataset consists of 250 observations, on an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, over three decades, 1973-1982, 1985-1994, and 1995-2004 . Volatility measures and averages of control variables cover the periods 1973-1982, 1985-1994 and 1995-2004 
